







From Global Collective Obligations to Institutional Obligations
Bill Wringe
I: Introduction
Although the notion of collective obligation rarely plays a significant role within analytic political philosophy as the subject is currently conceived, it seems easy to make a case that it should do so.​[1]​ For political philosophy involves theoretical reflection on politics, and the political domain is, among other things, an arena in which groups of human beings come together to confront the problems that they face together. In other words it is a domain within which collective action plays a central role. If there are collective obligations, then these place constraints on the kinds of collective action in which we may permissibly engage. So, it seems, considerations about collective obligations should play a significant role in thinking about the kinds of political institutions we ought to have, and the kind of  political action we should engage in.
In this paper, I shall be concerned with a particular kind of collective obligation which has recently been discussed by Martha Nussbaum: collective obligations which fall on humanity as a whole, or what we might call the 'global collective'. Many people might be skeptical of the existence of such obligations. In what follows, I shall try to make a case for their existence, and address one kind of reason for being skeptical about them: namely that the bearer of this obligation – the world's population as a whole – is not the kind of entity which has the capacity to act. However, my main concern will be with a second kind of reason that people might have for being dubious about such obligations. This is that it seems unclear what constraints, if any, such obligations might place on the actions of particular, concretely situated individuals such as you and I.  I shall address this issue by arguing that some kinds of forward-looking global obligation give rise to obligations on individuals to bring into existence institutions which can enable those obligations to be met. 
II: Global Collective Obligations: The Very Idea 
In recent years, a number of authors have explored the idea of a collective obligation.​[2]​ They have not, primarily, been concerned with the idea that certain obligations might fall on individuals in virtue of the groups of which they are members but rather with the idea that obligations might fall on some kind of collective body, existing over and above its individual members. Such obligations need not be reducible to the obligations of individuals; but they need not float entirely free of them. One might for example, conceive of certain obligations falling on individuals in virtue of their being members of a collective on which certain kinds of collective obligation falls.​[3]​ Thus, for example, we might see the obligations which parents have to care for their young children as falling, in the first instance on the parents collectively, and only subsequently and derivatively on one parent or other.      
If the notion of a collective obligation is coherent, as the work of these authors suggests, then it is important to ask what kinds of entities such obligations might fall upon. One obvious set of candidates consists of entities which have a formal organizational structure, such as nation-states, business corporations and smaller bodies such as committees within a larger organization.​[4]​ We should expect that in cases like this the relationship between the obligations which fall on the group  and those which fall on individual members of that group will be complex and will depend on a number of different features both of the group concerned, and of the details of the relationship between individual group members and the group as a whole. 
 Martha Nussbaum has argued that that there is another, more fundamental collective whose obligations ought to be of interest from the point of view of political philosophy. In Frontiers of Justice she argues that we all have entitlements based in justice to a minimum of a number of goods which feature on a list of core human capabilities. She then suggests that 'if this is so, we are all under a collective obligation to provide the people of the world with what they need....humanity is under a collective obligation to find ways of living and co-operating together so that all human beings have decent lives.'​[5]​We might wonder exactly who is included in the collective which is subject to this obligation. One  natural suggestion, which is consistent with, if not required by Nussbaum's text is that it includes everyone  currently alive. Call this collective the  ‘global  collective’: I shall assume that it is this collective that Nussbaum takes to be the bearer of the collective obligation she has in mind.  
Nussbaum does not give a detailed argument for the claim that 'humanity' has a collective obligation in any detail. However, I have argued for this conclusion in detail elsewhere.​[6]​ My argument starts from a well-known objection to the notion of subsistence rights,  conceived of as rights on the parts of individuals to have certain basic needs attended to. One standard objection to the claim that such rights exist is that if they did, they would necessarily  give rise to obligations on agents to see to it that such needs are fulfilled (or, more plausibly to see to it that individuals acquire the capacity to meet these needs). However there seem to be cases in which it seems implausible to hold that such an obligation could fall either on any individual human being or on any salient collective body. 
Consider for example the case of a starving individual in a drought-stricken region of a failed state such as Somalia. It may be quite implausible to think that any particular individual has an obligation to do something about her fate: everyone nearby  who is in a position to help may be in a similar plight. It may also be true that the most obvious collective bodies are in no position to help either (that is the point of focusing on an individual in a failed state). The state in question may lack the resources, the organizational capacity, or the territorial control which would be required to do anything about their situation.​[7]​
It would be unsatisfactory to say that individuals in such circumstances do not have the rights that more fortunately placed individuals - for example, those who are in a position to be helped by their compatriots – do have. To say so would be to say in effect that the protection that rights are supposed to afford individuals lapses in situations where they are most in need of it.​[8]​ This unsatisfactory conclusion can be avoided if we think that obligations can fall on a global collective.​[9]​The global collective body acts as what one might call an ‘obligation-bearer of last resort’. The existence of collective obligations which fall on this body is thus something which can be taken to be a presupposition of the claim that there is a right to have certain kinds of basic needs met. What we have is, in effect, a transcendental argument for the existence of obligations falling on a relatively unstructured body – namely a global collective.​[10]​
III: The Agency Objection
One might respond to this argument for global obligations by denying that  unstructured groups can be the subject of collective obligations. Call this the Agency Objection. The Agency Objection rests on a substantive claim about the kinds of entities on which collective obligations can fall: namely that they must be collective agents. Call this the Agency Claim. The Agency Claim is a substantive claim, which we should  not accept it without argument. ​[11]​
Here is an argument in favour of the Agency Claim. Call it the ‘Agency Argument’.
(Agency Argument)
(P1) Only groups with a certain kind of internal structure are capable of collective action 
(P2). Only groups that are capable of collective action can have collective obligations
C: Unstructured groups cannot be the subject of collective obligation.
The Agency Argument does not give us good reasons for accepting the Agency Claim. Both of its premises are questionable (and, in this context, contentious). The first premiss of the Agency Argument is problematic because the phenomenon of collective action has been analyzed in different ways by different authors. While it is true that on some accounts of collective action, collective action requires an agent with a certain amount of internal structure, there are other accounts, such as Christopher Kutz’s ‘minimalist’ account according to which this is not so.​[12]​ In the absence of detailed argument about the nature of collective action we cannot simply make an inference from lack of formal structure to the incapacity for agency.​[13]​
The second premiss of the argument is also problematic. Several authors, including Isaacs, Collins and Lawford-Smith appear to take it to be self-evident.​[14]​ However, it is not. In this context it is  highly contentious. One might argue (and I have in fact argued) that the existence of collective obligations does not require that the collective on whom the obligation falls be an agent but only  that some agent or agents be answerable for the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the obligation.​[15]​ In the case of obligations which fall on unstructured groups, the agents in question are typically some or all of those who make up the group in question.​[16]​   	
Anne Schwenkenbecher has argued that this response is unsatisfactory.​[17]​ She suggests that it involves conflating two distinct duties: a duty to act in a certain way (of which the subject is the collective) and a  duty on individuals to see that the collective organises itself in a way which would enable it to act in a certain way. However, we need not see things in this way. For it is plausible that there is a relationship between the duties of collectives  and the duties of individuals which make them up which is weaker than that of identity, but nevertheless non-accidental: the relationship of grounding. My suggestion is that a duty of a collective may ground (without being identical to) the duties of the individuals who make it up. The existence of this grounding relationship is shown up for us when we cite the existence of a duty falling on a collective in order to explain why some individual has a particular duty.​[18]​ 
One might wonder whether the second premise of the Agency  Argument follows from the claim that ‘Ought implies Can’.  It would do so if we accepted that only agents have the capacity to carry out the actions which are necessary for a collective obligations to be fulfilled. However, if we think that some collectives are potentially agents without being actual agents, then this claim seems false. For it seems plausible that if a collective is (merely) a potential agent, it is capable of doing any of the things which it would have the capacity to do if it were appropriately organized.​[19]​

Lawford-Smith has argued against this suggestion.  She suggests that in general we should not attribute to an unorganised group  the capacity to do things which it could do if organised. In cases where it is not practically possible for a group to organise itself it lacks the capacity to do the things which it could do if appropriately organized.​[20]​Thus, she suggests that the German army under Hitler did not have the capacity to bring Hitler down even though it could have done so if appropriately organised. As a consequence, she suggests, we should not regard the army as being to blame for not bringing Hitler down.

  Lawford-Smith draws the wrong conclusion from this example. It is plausible if the facts are as she describes them the army, considered as an institution was blameworthy. We might resist this conclusion on the grounds  that since no individual member of the army was in a position to be reasonably sure that others would have co-operated with them, no individual was to blame. However, we might want to allow for the possibility of cases where the blameworthiness of a collective agent does not entail the blameworthiness of any particular members.​[21]​ One reason for doing so would be if one regarded the structure or ethos of the institution or collective as playing a significant role in explaining the blameworthy  behaviour of the agent – something which seems highly plausible in the case Lawford-Smith describes.​[22]​
I have argued that both premisses of the Agency Argument are problematic. Since  there do not seem to be any  reasons independent of this argument for accepting the Agency Claim, we should take this claim to be unproven. So we are justified in ignoring the Agency Objection.
IV: Two Principles About Organizations
 It is not immediately clear what bearing the existence of a global obligation to satisfy subsistence needs might have on questions about what particular individuals should do in particular concrete situations. It is clear that such an obligation cannot give rise to an obligation on each individual to satisfy everyone’s subsistence needs. For no individual can do this. Indeed, it is the fact that no individual can do this, taken together with the claim that ought implies can, that motivated the suggestion there is a global collective obligation to be considered here in the first place. 
However, it does not follow from this that global obligations can give rise to no obligations on individuals. To draw this conclusion would be to overlook the possibility that collective obligations can give rise to obligations on individuals that are slightly more complex than those which we have considered so far.  
Here are two plausible principles about the ways in which obligations which fall on a collective can generate obligations on the individuals who make up that collective. 
(Organizational Principle 1)  
OP 1:  A stringent obligation which falls on a collective, and which can only be fulfilled by collective action of a sort that is unlikely to come about in a spontaneous and uncoordinated manner generates an obligation on each of the members of that collective to promote modes of organization that would enable the obligation to be carried out, to the extent that it is in their power to promote such forms of obligation . 
(Organizational Principle 2) 
OP 2: A stringent obligation which falls on a collective which is organized in such a way as to enable the co-ordination of collective actions that satisfy global obligations generates a pro tanto  obligation on individuals who form part of that collective to act in ways which are necessary for the fulfillment of those obligations.
OP 1 and OP 2 do not give rise to putative obligations on individuals which those individuals  are unable to satisfy. Furthermore they do appear to be capable of providing some kind of guidance concerning the ways in which particular  individuals should act in particular concrete circumstances. However, these facts about OP1 and OP2 do not establish their correctness. I shall attempt to provide some arguments for them in Sections V and VI. However,  before doing so, however, some clarificatory remarks are required.   
	Clearly both these principles require considerable explication. For example, much more needs to be said about which obligations are ‘stringent obligations’ and why both principles are restricted  to the case of stringent obligations.  The occurrence of the notion of a stringent obligation in these principles will also make a difference to the question of what counts as an  adequate argument for them. Any such argument will at a minimum have to explain why it only applies to stringent obligations; ideally it should also say something about whether there are any related principles which apply to non-stringent obligations.   
The intuitive case for the restricting the principles in some way is fairly obvious: there would be something wrong with a principle that generated, or threatened to generate, a need for a world state – or even a loose federation of states – out of a possible collective obligation to avoid littering sidewalks. The word stringent acts, to that extent as something of a place-holder. However, I shall take an obligation to be stringent provided that failing to meet it would result a large number of significant violations of individuals basic rights, where I use the term basic right in Henry Shue’s sense to mean a right which individuals must have in order for any further assignment of rights to them to have any point.​[23]​
This characterization of stringency still leaves the content of OP1 and OP2 somewhat indeterminate. Further specification would involve discussion of which rights are basic rights; of what counts as a ‘significant’ violation of them; and how many such violations are required to generate a stringent obligation. These are all important issues, which I shall not pursue for the time being. Even when these lacunae are acknowledged, it seems plausible that a good argument for OP1 and OP2 would go some way towards showing how claims about global obligation might give rise to relatively contentful requirements for action relating to particular individuals.​[24]​
OP 1 and OP 2 both assign individuals a duty to organise themselves in particular ways when they are members of collectives on which certain obligations fall. Stephanie Collins has also argued that individuals have a duty to organise in certain ways when faced with certain kinds of predicament which can only be solved by collective action.​[25]​ She calls these duties 'collectivization duties'. However, my position differs from Collins' in at least two respects. First, my principles leave open, in a way that Collins' do not, the possibility that some predicaments are best dealt with by a multiplicity of collective agents.​[26]​ Secondly, and more significantly, Collins appears to take the existence of collectivization duties to be a brute moral fact. This view seems implausible. By contrast, on my view the existence of the duties specified by OP1 and OP2 follows from more fundamental moral consideration, as I shall now argue.​[27]​
V: Connecting Collective and Individual Obligations
	In arguing for OP 1 and OP 2, I shall argue for a general principle connecting collective obligations to individual obligations.  I shall then attempt to apply this principle to the particular case of global obligations.  Section IV will be devoted to the first of these tasks; section V to the second. 
The principle connecting collective and individual obligations which I shall be appealing to is one on which all-out collective obligations entail, but are not equivalent to, certain pro tanto conditional obligations on the parts of the individuals who make up the collective. It is as follows:
(C to I)
If in a particular situation a collective C has an all-out obligation to Phi, then, for any member M of C, and for any set S of possible actions of members of C that, if performed together, would constitute C’s Phi-ing, if S includes M’s doing A, then M has a pro tanto obligation to do A. ​[28]​
It is natural to think that a  principle which is like C to I  but which applies to  all-out obligations rather than pro tanto ones must be true, since if  it were not, there would be situations in which all individual obligations were met, and in which some collective obligations remained unmet. Since the only way in which collectives can act is via the action of individuals, this seems absurd. However, David Copp has argued that cases of this sort can occur, giving as examples  situations where a committee fails to carry out its obligations even though none of the individuals on it fail to carry out their obligations.​[29]​
It is much harder to devise cases which constitute a counter-example to C to I when it is formulated as a principle about pro tanto obligations. The cases that Copp discusses involve situations where the obligations of a collective body impose pro tanto obligations on its members, and these pro tanto obligations are themselves defeated by countervailing obligations. However, it is worth noticing that we do not say  in general that when a pro tanto obligation is defeated by some countervailing consideration that that obligation no longer exists; merely that in this particular situation it does not yield an all-out obligation. Nevertheless, while this point is  suggestive, it does not amount to much of  an argument for the view that there is a connection between collective obligations and the pro tanto obligations of individuals.
Here is an argument for (C to I), based on a broadly Kantian account of morality. It starts from one of Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative -  the formula of the kingdom of ends. Kant argues that any rational being should will as if they were the legislator for a kingdom of ends.​[30]​ One plausible suggestion as to what Kant means by this is that a kingdom of ends is, among other things, a state of affairs where all rational beings are treated as ends-in-themselves. Since Kant also seems to hold that all of our duties can be derived from a duty to treat rational beings as ends in themselves, it seems as though a kingdom of ends would have to be a situation in which every obligation bearer fulfils all of their obligations.
If we are good Kantians, then the scope of the universal quantifier here is not simply  the class of human beings, for Kant thinks that moral laws apply to all rational beings. One might think, as an alternative, that it ranges over all agents. But if the class of obligation holders is wider than the class of agents – as I have argued it is -  it is hard to see why the quantifier in the suggestion should not range over all obligation bearers.
Kant also holds that 'whoever wills the end wills  also the means that are indispensably necessary to his action.'​[31]​ So,  if there are collective obligations, and a legislator in a kingdom of ends necessarily wills that all obligations – including collective obligations – should be satisfied (as I have suggested), then such a legislator in a kingdom of ends wills the necessary means for satisfying collective obligations be satisfied. However, as I have already argued,  the only means by which collective obligations can be carried out is through individual action. So a legislator in a kingdom of ends will will that individuals act in such a way as to enable the obligations of the collectives of which they are members to be carried out.
This establishes something very close to the conclusion that we want to reach. For, on a Kantian view, the moral law is given by  the content of what a legislator in a kingdom of ends would will. So if we have established that a universal legislator would will that individuals act in such a way as to allow collective obligations to be carried out by means of their concerted efforts, then we have established that there are moral obligations on individuals of the sort that I have been arguing for.  
One might object that C-to-I runs into difficulties in situations where there is more than one way for a collective to fulfil a collective obligation. For C-to-I seems to imply that every individual has a pro tanto duty to do the action that would be doing their part, not just in a collectively selected way of fulfilling the collective's duty, but in every possible way of fulfilling the collective's duty.  Since it seems plausible that  some pairs of such individual actions will not conflict with one another, it seems to follow from C to I that individuals have undefeated pro tanto obligations to do both.
This objection is unpersuasive as it stands. If C to I meant that collective obligations could give rise to conflicting all-out obligations, this would clearly count against it. But there is no obvious reason for thinking that we cannot have conflicting pro tanto obligations. It would also count against C to I if the pro tanto obligations it gave rise to were all of the same strength: if so, this might give rise to a situation where collective obligations failed to generate any reasons in favour of a particualr course of action which were not cancelled out by countervailing considerations againts it of exactly the same strength. However, there is no reason to think that all the pro tanto obligations generated by C to I should give rise to reasons  of equal strength. There might be all sorts of reasons for preferring one way of meeting a collective obligation to others: one might be less costly, or more salient, or distribute the burdens involved more equally. Or one might be a means of fulfilling the obligation arrived at by a method of collective decision making which we had independent reason to value.​[32]​   
One might think that there are counterexamples to C to I. Suppose that it is extremely unlikely that a collective will fulfill the obligations under which it falls. Is it still true that members of the collective have a pro tanto duty to perform actions which would make it possible for the collective to perform the actions that it needs to in order to fulfill its duty? If the argument I have given suggests is correct, then it is. One might think this courts absurdity. It certainly would, if the duties generated by C to I ended up outweighing other duties – and in particular, duties whose performance could reasonably be expected to benefit some particular individuals. However, it is not clear that there is any risk of this. Pro tanto duties  can, after all, be outweighed by other duties. It seems reasonable to think that cases where it is unlikely that other members of a collective will act in the way that is required for a certain duty to be fulfilled will turn out to be relatively weak.  
Pro tanto duties can be outweighed by other duties. Some people hold that they can also be outweighed by  reasons  which are not moral duties -  for example,  reasons generated by projects or values which are central to my identity. Someone who holds this view will have a response to the claim that C to I might require too much of me if it requires me to act in ways which would enable collectives to behave in certain ways even when the collective concerned is extremely unlikely to act in that way and even if acting in those ways does not conflict with other duties. On the other hand, someone who does not hold this view should, I think, simply find the putative objection unpersuasive. 
What about cases where my acting in a certain way makes it less likely that other members of a collective will do what is required to meet its obligation? It might initially seem absurd to think that I could have a duty to act in a certain way to enable a collective to fulfill a duty if the result of my doing so is to make it less likely that the collective will in fact fulfill that duty. However, C to I does not generate a conclusion which is absurd. Suppose it is true that although A is a member of a set of actions which if performed together would make it possible for a given collective to meet an obligation O, my doing A  nonetheless makes it less likely that a collective of which I am a member will fulfill O. For this to be true, there must be a way in which the collective could fulfill O which involves my refraining from A. If so, then I have a pro tanto duty  to refrain from A. Provided my duty to refrain from A is stronger than my duty to perform A, there is no obvious absurdity. And it seems that in fact my duty to refrain from  A in this situation should be regarded as stronger than my duty to perform A: it is stronger precisely because my refraining form A makes it more likely that the collective of which I am a part meets its obligations.     
VI: Deriving  OP 1 and OP 2
  Here is an argument intended  to establish that OP 1 and OP 2 follow from C to I.
OP 1 talks about situations where a collective has an obligation which is extremely unlikely to be met by spontaneous action on the part of its members. Furthermore, if collective obligations are constrained by the principle that ought implies can, then such obligations can be met by some combination of actions. If the obligations cannot be met by spontaneous action,  and can be met in some way, then the way they can be met is, presumably, by means of organized action. But organization of the required sort does not come out of nowhere: it needs to be put in place by the action of individuals. So if a collective can only solve a problem by acting in an organized manner, it can only solve that problem by doing what is required to organize itself in the requisite manner.
To say this is to say that if a collective has a duty which it cannot fulfill without organized action, then the ways in which it can meet that obligation involve organizing itself in a way that enable it to meet that obligation.​[33]​ If there is a duty on the individuals that make up the collective to act in ways which would enable them to fulfill the obligation, and these ways involve organizing themselves in particular ways then, according to C to I  they have a pro tanto  duty  to organize themselves in these ways. But  this is what  OP 1 says. 
I have said that collectives that are unlikely to be able to meet their obligations in virtue of the spontaneous actions of individuals who make up the collective may be able to meet them by organizing themselves. One might wonder whether this is the only possibility. In principle it seems as though it might not be. A collective might acquire the sort of organization required for meeting its obligations not by organizing itself, but by having some form of organization imposed on it from outside. This possibility is clearly irrelevant to the main kind of case that I have in mind here – that of the global collective, for in that case there is ex hypothesi nothing outside the collective which could impose the requisite form of organization on it. It is certainly possible to imagine situations involving other unorganized collectives are concerned where the necessary form of organization might be imposed from the outside. 
Suppose that the citizens of a nation comprehensively defeated in war have a collective obligation to institute come form of order which will perform the basic functions of a state (as one might hold, of the people of Germany in 1945).​[34]​It may be that in some situations the required kind of order is likeliest to come through being externally imposed. Nevertheless, in general the chances of some external body imposing on a collective body just the forms of organization that it need to fulfill its collective obligations (as opposed to serving the interests of those who are imposing that form of order) seems small enough to be discounted. It may be optimistic, but it does not seem to be unduly optimistic to suppose that in general unstructured collective bodies are more likely to meet their obligations by finding their own form of organisation than by having some form of organisation imposed upon them from outside   
OP 2 is more complicated. However, in most cases where a collective is organized in such a way as to enable an obligation to be met, it seems likely that the way in which the obligation is most likely to be met will involve the individuals acting in accordance with the forms of organization that already exist and which would enable them to meet the obligations. (It need not be the only way: perhaps the institutions we have are sufficient to enable us to fulfill a certain duty, but are  not the only ones which could enable us to do so.) Changing forms of organization is complicated, time-consuming and unpredictable: in most cases obligations which could be met by a changed form of organization are less likely to be met in that way. So in most cases a pro tanto duty to  act in accordance with existing organizations to meet given collective obligations will not be outweighed by a competing and incompatible duty to come up with other forms of organization.
I noted in section IV that OP 1 and OP2 were stated in terms of ‘stringent’ collective obligations. I also noticed a concomitant argumentative burden of explaining why this should be so. Nothing in the argument that I have given so far provides such an explanation. In fact the argument seems to justify much more inclusive principles, applying to all collective obligations, and not merely to stringent ones. This might even be taken as an objection to the arguments: the objection would be that if the arguments given are correct, our collective obligations give rise to too many obligations on individuals to be plausible.
My response is that the  argument does provide support for versions of OP 1 and OP 2 which are not limited to stringent obligations. However, I have also argued that the obligations on individuals which these collective obligations give rise to are only pro tanto duties, and that in some cases these pro tanto duties might have a weight that is so low as to mean that they are almost always over-ridden. The point of restricting OP 1 and OP 2 duties to situations where the obligations involved are quite stringent is that it is plausible that in these cases – and to a far lesser extent in other cases – the pro tanto duties generated by our collective obligations are likely to be strong enough not to be generally over-ridden by countervailing considerations.      
VII: Objections and Replies
The account I have given so far might give rise to a number of misgivings. For example, one might worry that OP 1 could  generate an obligation on the world’s population to organize itself in oppressive ways  in response to pressing moral obligations. This objection seems unconvincing. In order to be moved by it, one would have to be simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic about human capacities in a way which seems difficult to reconcile. For one would have to believe both that an oppressive form of organization was the only way in which human beings could meet the moral obligations in question (hence the pessimism) and also that such a form of organization would not lead to large scale violations of basic rights of a sort that would give rise to a global obligation to do what one could to  disrupt its workings (hence the optimism). While there is nothing formally inconsistent about a combination of attitudes of this sort, it is difficult to see what could motivate it.    
A second worry is that OP 2 might seem unduly conservative, since it requires individuals to support existing institutions, even when they are less than optimal, when these institutions provide individuals with ways of meeting collective obligations. Still, the conservatism of OP 2 should not be overstated. It is not clear that the institutions that we currently have do enable us to meet our existing global obligations. If so, then OP 2 does not have especially conservative implications as things currently stand: it simply does not apply (and OP 1 has potentially quite radical implications). Furthermore, whether or not OP 2 would be very conservative in practice will depend on what kinds of institutions would be required for us to meet collectively our collective obligations. It is at least arguable that such institutions would at least need to be fairly flexible, and open to reform in the long-term. If so, then the charge of undue conservatism is unwarranted.    
 Finally, the structure of the account I have given might seem somewhat counter-intuitive. I have argued that the existence of global collective obligations creates pro tanto obligations on individuals to create and support institutions which are capable of discharging those responsibilities. One might describe this as a ‘bottom to top to bottom to middle’ account: we start off with particular individuals and their needs (at, as it were ground level), which generate obligations on a very large collective (metaphorically somewhere in the stratosphere), which generates obligations on individuals (back at ground-level) which generate obligations to support institutions (at somewhere between ground and the stratosphere). It might seem as though a simpler account (where obligations only flowed in one direction) would be simpler, and to that extent preferable.
It is not clear how seriously we should take intuitions about the form which an account of our obligations ‘must’ take , except insofar as those intuitions can be supported and articulated in arguments. But in any case, the account that I have given does not have the form which the objection takes to be  problematic. The view that I have been developing is one on which we see the global collective as being a collective with no internal structure (other than the ‘structure’ which it has insofar as different individuals belong to it.), rather than as a collective body encompassing all of the world’s population with some kind of political structure.  
Global collective bodies of  this latter form, such as a  world state; or a federation of all the states of the world, could be brought into existence. Indeed one might think that the arguments that I have put forward in the main body of this paper show that we have an obligation to try to bring them into existence. If it existed, a body of this sort might be seen as having other institutions as subordinate parts which could have obligations which derived directly from the obligations of the organized collective body. However, it is not clear that we should see any existing global body as being an institution of this form. Furthermore, whether or not we do so, we should see such a body, with the political structure that it would have to have in order to confer obligations on subordinate bodies as being distinct from, and less fundamental form a theoretical point of view, than the unstructured global collective which gives rise to obligations on individuals summarized in OP 1 and OP2.
VIII: Conclusion
If the arguments of this paper are correct, the existence of global collective obligations gives rise to obligations on individuals to institute and support forms of organization which would enable those obligations to be met. If so, then although the notion of a global collective obligation is a highly abstract one, recognizing that such obligations exist can nonetheless have practical implications for concretely placed human beings. This is a result with significant practical and philosophical implications.
Nevertheless some readers might doubt whether arguments at the high-level of generality which has been employed in this paper can have much practical significance for particular individuals in concrete situations. However, it is worth distinguishing between different functions which a focus on concrete examples might fulfill. One is a more or less rhetorical function: that of showing to an audience that might be more or less skeptical of the power of abstract reflection that that reflection  is not simply a piece of sophisticated word-play. A second is that of providing some sort of guidance about a particular practical situation. A third is that of providing some sort of check on the plausibility of a piece of abstract reasoning. These three functions are distinct from one another, and require different approaches to the use of concrete examples. In particular, what is required by the second and third functions is at odds with what is required by the first. Furthermore, the third function is most important from a purely philosophical point of view (although that may not be the only point of view worth considering in this context). Developing a concrete example in sufficient detail to achieve this would probably require a separate paper.  
A second reason for being skeptical about the practical implications of what I have said relates to the content of my conclusions. In trying to connect global obligations with concrete obligations falling on particular individuals, I have argued that global collective obligations give rise to pro tanto obligations. I have also conceded that some pro tanto obligations are relatively weak, and can easily be over-ridden, both by other obligations and perhaps even by considerations which are not obligations. One might wonder whether this nullifies any practical significance my conclusions might have. 
One might respond to this concern by attempting to develop a plausible theory about the weights that different kinds of obligations have in different situations, and the circumstances in which one obligation can over-ride another. Some philosophers – moral particularists – deny that any general account of this sort can be given; and, although there is no space to discuss this issue in great detail here, I am at least sympathetic to some of the arguments that they have given.​[35]​ However, even if particularists are correct,  I have shown both  that some considerations which one might not otherwise take to have any moral weight do in fact have some, and explained why they do.  This is not a trivial matter. 
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